Pretrial Publicity and Civil Cases: A Two-Way Street? by Bornstein, Brian H. et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology Psychology, Department of 
February 2002 
Pretrial Publicity and Civil Cases: A Two-Way Street? 
Brian H. Bornstein 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, bbornstein2@unl.edu 
Brooke L. Whisenhunt 
Louisiana State University 
Robert J. Nemeth 
Louisiana State University 
Deborah L. Dunaway 
Louisiana State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub 
 Part of the Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
Bornstein, Brian H.; Whisenhunt, Brooke L.; Nemeth, Robert J.; and Dunaway, Deborah L., "Pretrial Publicity 
and Civil Cases: A Two-Way Street?" (2002). Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology. 153. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub/153 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology, Department of at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications, 
Department of Psychology by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Published in Law and Human Behavior, 26:1 (February 2002), pp. 3–17. Copyright © 2002 Amer-
ican Psychology-Law Society, Division 41 of the American Psychology Association. Published 
by Springer Netherlands.  http://www.springerlink.com/content/1573-661X/ Used by permission.
 
Pretrial Publicity and Civil Cases: A Two-Way Street?
Brian H. Bornstein,* Brooke L. Whisenhunt, Robert J. Nemeth, and 
Deborah L. Dunaway
Department of Psychology, Louisiana State University
Published pretrial publicity (PTP) research has been conducted almost exclu-
sively with criminal cases and has focused on PTP that is detrimental to the de-
fense. The current research examined the effects of PTP in a civil case to de-
termine if PTP can have a biasing effect against either the defendant or the 
plaintiff in civil litigation. In Experiment 1, participants exposed to PTP biased 
against the defendant were more likely to reach a liable verdict than partici-
pants who read a control article or PTP biased against the plaintiff. Experiment 
2 demonstrated that a judicial admonition did not reduce the biasing effect of 
PTP about a civil defendant. However, participants given the admonition both 
before and after the trial evidence viewed the defendant as less culpable than 
participants given the admonition after the trial only or not at all. The implica-
tions for the legal system are discussed. 
The fundamental confl ict between the right to a fair trial and freedom of the press has 
been emphasized in studies concerning pretrial publicity (PTP) and its potentially prej-
udicial impact on juror decision making (Carroll et al., 1986; Fulero, 1987; Linz & 
Penrod, 1992). In recent years, researchers have begun to examine the effects of PTP 
as well as judicial remedies for cases in which jurors have been exposed to PTP. Pub-
lished PTP research has been conducted almost exclusively with criminal cases and 
has focused only on PTP that is considered to be detrimental to the defense (Carroll et 
al., 1986; Linz & Penrod, 1992; Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & Jimenez-Lorente, 1999; 
Studebaker & Penrod, 1997). 
Media attention to civil cases has increased recently (e.g., class action lawsuits 
concerning tobacco companies, breast implants, etc.), warranting concern about PTP 
in the civil arena as well. In justifi cation of this concern, the sole previous study of 
PTP in civil trials (Kline & Jess, 1966) found that PTP was discussed often in mock 
civil jury deliberations. Civil cases afford the opportunity to explore the potentially 
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biasing effects of PTP concerning both parties. Although prosecutorial behavior may 
provide fodder for media reports about criminal trials (e.g., coercion, fabricated evi-
dence, police misconduct), the criminal justice system’s paramount concern with de-
fendants’ rights understandably leads to an emphasis on PTP regarding the defendant. 
In a civil trial, on the other hand, either the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial could be compromised by prejudicial PTP. The present research was designed to 
examine the effects of PTP in a civil case. 
How much prejudicial PTP in civil cases is actually released? Imrich, Mullin, and 
Linz (1995) conducted a content analysis of 14 popular U.S. newspapers over a peri-
od of 8 weeks. Overall, Imrich et al. found that 27% of the suspects in crime stories 
during the period were described in a prejudicial manner. Although a comparable anal-
ysis of PTP in civil cases has not been performed, Bailis and MacCoun (1996) sam-
pled a number of national newsmagazines (e.g., Time, Newsweek) and found that they 
gave steady coverage to tort litigation. Moreover, they found that most of the coverage 
distorted actual court statistics. For example, the media considerably overrepresented 
plaintiffs’ victory rate at trial. 
These studies suggest that a nontrivial percentage of participants in both the crim-
inal and civil justice systems are subjected to media coverage containing information 
prejudicial to their case. More important for the legal system is the question of wheth-
er exposure to PTP infl uences jurors’ verdicts. Although researchers disagree about 
whether there is enough empirical support to help the courts in establishing guidelines 
for PTP (Carroll et al., 1986; Fulero, 1987), in general, research has shown that expo-
sure to PTP can serve to prejudice the jury against criminal defendants (Fain, McClos-
key, & Tomlinson, 1997; Linz & Penrod, 1992; Moran & Cutler, 1991; Mullin, Imrich, 
& Linz, 1996; Otto, Penrod, & Dexter, 1994; Steblay et al., 1999). 
Recently, various aspects of PTP have been examined, including the effects of 
emotional versus factual PTP (Kramer & Kerr, 1989; Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 1990; 
Wilson & Bornstein, 1998), the source of the PTP (Ogloff & Vidmar, 1994; Wilson & 
Bornstein, 1998), and case-specifi c versus general PTP (Greene &Wade, 1987; Mullin 
et al., 1996). The prejudicial impact of PTP on participants’ conviction rates in mock 
criminal cases has remained quite robust across these many variations. Research has 
yet to address the question of whether PTP can have similar effects in civil litigation. 
However, civil cases may be increasingly vulnerable to the prejudicial effects of PTP 
with the recent surge of high-profi le, class-action lawsuits. In addition, the lower stan-
dard of proof in civil cases suggests that extraneous factors such as PTP might have a 
greater impact than in criminal cases. 
Landsman and Rakos (1994) studied the effect of potentially biasing information 
on both judges and jurors in a product liability case. Although this study addressed the 
impact of prejudicial information presented during rather than prior to trial, it is still 
instructive about individuals’ ability to disregard certain information in reaching a ver-
dict. They presented judges and potential jurors with a vignette describing a product li-
ability case and exposed them to (1) no biasing information, (2) biasing information 
against the defendant with instructions to exclude/disregard the material, or (3) biasing 
information with instructions to admit the material. Landsman and Rakos found that 
both judges and mock jurors found the defendant liable more often after being exposed 
to biasing information, regardless of instructions to exclude/disregard the information. 
In a similar study, Tanford and Cox (1988) investigated the impact of impeachment 
evidence on jurors’ decisions in a civil trial. Generally, impeachment evidence is ad-
missible if its sole purpose is to discredit testimony; inferences about the character of 
the witness, other than honesty, are not allowed. In such cases, jurors are usually giv-
en limiting instructions by the judge, instructing them that they may use the impeach-
ment evidence to determine the defendant’s credibility but not liability. Two kinds of 
impeachment evidence against the defendant were manipulated: evidence of a prior 
conviction for perjury (with or without limiting instructions) and character evidence 
of honesty. Tanford and Cox found little effect of impeachment evidence on liabili-
ty judgments. However, although impeachment evidence failed to affect liability ver-
dicts directly, mock jurors’ ratings of the defendant’s character traits revealed that they 
often made impermissible inferences regarding traits other than honesty. Thus, just as 
in criminal cases (e.g., Greene & Dodge, 1995; Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Thompson, 
Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981), jurors in civil cases appear to be unable to disregard dam-
aging information after it has been presented at trial. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
This study was designed to determine whether the detrimental effects of PTP gen-
eralize to civil trials. In addition, the effects of negative PTP about both litigants were 
examined. Based on the robust nature of PTP effects in criminal cases (e.g., Steblay et 
al., 1999; Studebaker & Penrod, 1997), as well as the effects of inadmissible evidence 
in civil cases (Landsman & Rakos, 1994; Tanford & Cox, 1988), we hypothesized that 
exposure to negative PTP about either party would reduce mock jurors’ verdicts for 
that party, relative to a control condition with no prejudicial PTP. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 81 students enrolled in undergraduate psychology classes who 
received extra course credit. Two participants were dropped for failing to follow in-
structions, and an additional 7 participants were randomly excluded in order to have 
equal numbers of participants in each condition. The fi nal sample contained 72 partici-
pants (24 per condition); it was composed of 59% females, and the age range of partic-
ipants was 18-25 (Mdn = 19.5). 
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions, in which they 
read an article containing basic information about the case (control condition), an arti-
cle containing additional negative information about the plaintiff (plaintiff-PTP condi-
tion). or an article containing additional negative information about the defendant (de-
fendant-PTP condition). 
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Materials 
The case. A hypothetical lawsuit modifi ed from actual cases (Bornstein & Rajki, 
1994; Chapman & Bornstein, 1996) described a woman diagnosed with ovarian cancer 
who fi led suit against a chemical company. Participants read a one-page, single-spaced 
summary of the case (excerpted in Table 1). The text included the following informa-
tion: a description of the plaintiff and her injury, a description of the defendant and al-
leged cause, expert scientifi c testimony supporting each side concerning the product’s 
capability of causing ovarian cancer, and the amount of compensatory damages re-
quested. The case materials were identical for participants in all conditions. 
PTP. The control article (111 words) contained general information about the case, 
largely reiterating information contained in the trial summary. A pilot study was con-
ducted to determine which items would be used as the PTP. Participants (N = 16) read 
the trial summary, gave a dichotomous rating of liability, and then rated 30 fabricated 
pieces of evidence. Participants were asked to determine what effect each individual 
piece of evidence would have had on their verdict if they had received this information 
as part of the original trial summary (1-not liable, 5-no effect, 9-liable). Five items that 
were rated signifi cantly higher than 5 (p < .05) were selected to be the defendant-PTP 
items, whereas 5 items that were rated signifi cantly lower than 5 (p < .05) were select-
ed to be the plaintiff-PTP items. These items were added to the control article for their 
respective conditions (see Table 1). 
A second pilot study was then conducted to insure that both the defendant and 
plaintiff PTP articles produced signifi cant bias compared to the control article. This 
was accomplished by randomly assigning participants to read one of the three arti-
cles (without reading the trial summary) and provide a liability rating. Planned com-
parisons were used to analyze the data. Participants who read the defendant-PTP arti-
cle were more likely to fi nd the defendant liable than those who read the control arti-
cle, t(78) = 3.15, p < .01. Correspondingly, participants who read the plaintiff-PTP ar-
ticle were less likely to fi nd the defendant liable than those who read the control arti-
cle, t(78) = 4.20, p < .001. 
Trial Instructions. Participants also read a two-page handout containing general in-
structions about the trial. Defi nitions of plaintiff, defendant, and compensatory damag-
es were provided. In addition, the guidelines included specifi c instructions regarding 
civil cases such as instructing the participants to determine the facts solely from the 
evidence presented in the case, and explaining that the defendant is legally liable only 
if the defendant is more likely than not to have caused the plaintiff’s injury (i.e., the 
preponderance of the evidence standard). 
Procedure 
Participants completed the study in groups of up to 15 people. The experiment was 
conducted in three phases. First, participants read one of the three articles. Participants 
were told that the information was an article about a civil case but were given no fur-
ther information. Next, participants read the trial instructions and summary. Finally, 
participants completed several dependent measures: 
1.  A dichotomous liability judgment, applying the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. 
2.  An estimate of the likelihood that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury 
(0-100). Participants were instructed that any rating above 50 indicated a be-
lief that the defendant was more likely than not to have caused the harm. 
3.  Participants who indicated that the defendant was liable for the plaintiff’s in-
juries assigned compensation for the plaintiff. 
4.  Finally, participants rated their overall perceptions of the plaintiff and the 
defendant on a 7-point scale (1-very unsympathetic, 7-very sympathetic). 
Results 
The dichotomous liability ratings were scored as 0 (not liable) or 1 (liable), and 
separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted for the remaining dependent measures.1 
Liability Judgments 
The percentage of participants in each condition who found the defendant liable 
can be seen in Table 2. As predicted, there was a signifi cant effect of PTP on jurors’ li-
ability judgments, F(2, 69) = 6.98. Participants who read the plaintiff-PTP were less 
likely to reach a liable verdict (25%) than participants who read the control article 
(46%), whereas participants who read the defendant-PTP were most likely to reach 
Table 1. Excerpts From Case Summary and PTP Articles 
Case summary  “Kathy is suing a large chemical manufacturing company. She claims that some 
of the chemicals that the company has stored at a dump one mile from her house 
have seeped into the neighborhood’s water supply, and that regularly drinking 
the contaminated water caused her cancer.. . A major issue at trial is whether or 
not a particular chemical, called Ketamine, causes cancer. If so, then the chem-
ical company is liable for damages, since both parties accept that high levels of 
Ketamine leaked from the dump into the neighborhood’s water supply; if not, 
then the chemical company is not liable.” 
PTP articles 
Control  “Since moving to her neighborhood, Mrs. Summers has been diagnosed with 
ovarian cancer which she alleges was caused by the Ketamine in the water sup-
ply. The company does not dispute the fact that high levels of Ketamine leaked 
from the chemical dump site into the water supply, but Chemco offi cials argue 
that there is no proof that Ketamine is a cancer-causing agent.” 
Defendant  “Chemco has been sued several times in the past 5 years by other women suffer-
ing from ovarian cancer. The chemical company has also been named in numer-
ous lawsuits concerning environmental hazards. Greenpeace, an environmental 
watchdog organization, reported that the chemical company was polluting the 
environment and trying to cover up these allegations.” 
Plaintiff  “Mrs. Summers reportedly had several ovarian problems before coming to live 
near the dump site. She also reportedly told a friend that she rarely even drinks 
tap water. Mrs. Summers has a prior criminal history of money laundering and 
fraud.” 
1 For results with directional hypotheses, the planned comparisons use one-tailed p-values. 
Otherwise, p-values are two-tailed. In both experiments, an alpha level of p < .05 was chosen for 
the interpretation of signifi cant results. Specifi c p-values are therefore reported only for marginal-
ly signifi cant results of theoretical interest.
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a liable verdict (75%). Planned comparisons contrasting each biasing PTP condition 
with the control condition showed that participants were signifi cantly more likely to 
fi nd the defendant liable when they read PTP that was biased against the defendant, 
t(46) = 2.12, but only marginally less likely to fi nd the defendant liable when they read 
PTP that was biased against the plaintiff, t(46) = 1.51, p < .07. 
PTP exerted a comparable effect on participants’ causality judgments, F(2, 69) = 
9.25. Participants judged the defendant as most likely to have caused the plaintiff’s in-
jury in the defendant-PTP condition, and least likely in the plaintiff-PTP condition, 
with the mean for the control condition intermediate between these two extremes (see 
Table 2). Planned comparisons showed that the mean causality rating in the defendant-
PTP condition was signifi cantly greater than in the control condition, t(46) = 2.52, 
whereas the mean causality rating in the plaintiff-PTP condition was marginally lower 
than in the control condition, t(46) = 1.60, p < .06. 
Compensation
Thirty-fi ve participants found the defendant liable (6–18 per condition) and there-
fore awarded compensation. As compensation awards were positively skewed, analysis 
was based on a logarithmic transformation of the data. The amount of money awarded to 
the plaintiff was not signifi cantly different for the three conditions, F(2, 32) = 1.17. Thus, 
PTP did not appear to affect the amount of money participants awarded to the plaintiff. 
Perceptions
Participants’ perceptions of the litigants are shown in Fig. 1. PTP condition signif-
icantly affected perceptions of the plaintiff, F(2, 69) = 7.94, and had a marginally sig-
nifi cant effect on perceptions of the defendant, F(2, 69) = 3.01, p < .06. Planned com-
parisons revealed that participants in the defendant-PTP condition perceived the plain-
tiff as signifi cantly more sympathetic (M = 6.17, SD = 0.87) than did participants in 
the control condition (M = 5.50, SD = 1.02), t(46) = 2.44, and participants in the plain-
tiff-PTP condition perceived the plaintiff as signifi cantly less sympathetic (M = 4.83, 
SD = 1.49) than did participants in the control condition, t(46) = 1.80. 
The effect of PTP on participants’ perception of the defendant was less robust. Par-
ticipants in the plaintiff-PTP condition rated the defendant as signifi cantly more sym-
pathetic (M = 3.38, SD = 1.74) than did participants in the control condition (M = 2.46, 
SD = 1.32), t = 2.06, but there was no signifi cant difference in perceptions of the de-
fendant between participants in the defendant-PTP and control conditions, t(46)= 0.11. 
Discussion 
Consistent with the general fi ndings of PTP research in criminal trials (Fain et al., 
1997; Linz & Penrod, 1992; Moran & Cutler, 1991; Mullin et al., 1996; Otto et al., 
1994; Steblay et al., 1999; Studebaker & Penrod, 1997),the present experiment demon-
strated that PTP can have a prejudicial impact on jurors’ judgments of liability in a civ-
il trial as well. Mock jurors who read an article containing negative information about 
the defendant prior to the trial were signifi cantly more likely to fi nd the defendant liable 
than mock jurors who read an article containing only neutral information. This result is 
also consistent with the fi ndings of Landsman and Rakos (1994); however, mock jurors 
in the present experiment were presented with negative information as a newspaper ar-
ticle prior to the presentation of the facts of the case, whereas in the Landsman and Ra-
kos study, participants were presented with inadmissible evidence at trial. 
Additionally, Landsman and Rakos (1994) demonstrated that exposure to biasing 
information about a civil defendant can affect mock jurors’ judgments, whereas the 
present experiment demonstrated that biasing information about either the plaintiff or 
the defendant can affect mock jurors’ judgments. Previous research examining PTP 
has tended to focus on information that is detrimental to the defendant; however, infor-
mation that may be detrimental to the plaintiff in a civil trial, or to the prosecution in 
a criminal trial, is also plausible, especially in high-profi le cases. In the present study, 
mock jurors who read PTP that contained unfavorable information about the plain-
tiff were less likely to fi nd the defendant liable than were mock jurors who read neg-
ative PTP about the defendant. However, the effect of negative PTP directed toward 
the plaintiff was less robust than the effect of PTP directed toward the defendant, as 
there was only a marginally signifi cant difference in liability judgments between par-
ticipants who read neutral PTP and those who read the plaintiff PTP. 
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These results suggest that PTP may have more widespread effects than simply bi-
asing jurors against criminal defendants. The reason that mock jurors’ liability judg-
ments were swayed by PTP is partly refl ected in their subjective ratings of how they 
felt toward the defendant and plaintiff. Although the plaintiff was viewed as more sym-
pathetic than the defendant overall, feelings toward both the plaintiff and the defendant 
were affected by the type of PTP. 
Interestingly, although PTP had a signifi cant effect on mock jurors’ liability judg-
ments, it had no effect on their subsequent compensation awards. This result is some-
what surprising, as much more subtle information, such as the amount of money the 
plaintiff requests for compensation, has been found to affect mock jurors’ damage 
awards (e.g., Chapman & Bornstein, 1996). It should be noted that although com-
pensation did not differ signifi cantly across conditions, the median awards paralleled 
participants’ liability decisions: $175,000 in the plaintiff-PTP condition, $300,000 in 
the control condition, and $500,000 in the defendant-PTP condition. Thus, it is like-
ly that the failure to attain statistical signifi cance was due to the relatively low power 
in the compensation analysis; for example, only 6 participants awarded compensa-
tion in the plaintiff-PTP condition. This limitation is addressed by including a larger 
sample in Experiment 2. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest the need for further study regarding possible 
remedies for the impact of PTP on jurors’ judgments. Some of the more common rem-
edies include changing the trial venue, gagging the press, using voir dire to select ju-
rors with no exposure to PTP or to neutralize its effects, continuance, and judicial ad-
monitions (Kramer et al., 1990; Studebaker & Penrod, 1997). Most of these remedies 
are either impractical—such as continuance, changing the venue, or selecting jurors 
with no exposure—or carry other adverse effects, such as restricting media rights. 
The least objectionable methods attempt to neutralize PTP’s effects through voir 
dire or judicial admonitions. These strategies consist of specifi c guidance to the ju-
rors from the judge or one of the attorneys, directing them to base their verdict on the 
evidence presented at trial and to disregard any PTP about the case. However, evi-
dence from studies utilizing criminal cases has demonstrated the relative ineffective-
ness of both voir dire (Dexter, Cutler, & Moran, 1992; Kerr, Kramer, Carroll, & Al-
fi ni, 1991) and judicial instructions (Kramer et al., 1990; Sue, Smith, & Gilbert, 1974) 
at minimizing PTP’s effects. Instructions to ignore biasing pretrial information are no 
more effective than cautionary instructions to ignore information to which jurors are 
exposed during trial, which have been found to be unsuccessful in both criminal (e.g., 
Greene & Dodge, 1995; Kassin & Sommers, 1997) and civil litigation (Landsman & 
Rakos, 1994; Tanford & Cox, 1988). 
A possible reason for the failure of judicial admonitions to mitigate the effect of 
either PTP or inadmissible evidence is the timing of the instructions. Both Sue et al. 
(1974) and Kramer et al. (1990) provided judicial instructions to ignore PTP at the 
completion of trial. However, Kaplan and Wrightsman (1979) found that judicial in-
structions were more effective when they came at both the outset and the conclusion 
of trial than when they were given only at the end. Furthermore, Smith (1991) found 
that mock jurors who received judicial instructions both before and after the trial 
were better able to apply the law and were able to defer verdict decisions until after 
the trial, compared to mock jurors who received instructions before the trial only, af-
ter the trial only, or not at all. ForsterLee, Horowitz, and Bourgeois (1993) extended 
Smith’s fi ndings to a civil case, demonstrating that mock jurors who received judi-
cial instructions prior to the presentation of evidence were more likely to decide the 
case based on the merit of the evidence than were mock jurors who received the ju-
dicial instructions afterwards. 
However, the effectiveness of using a judicial admonition as a remedy for the ef-
fects of PTP in a civil trial has not yet been examined. Experiment 2 examined wheth-
er receiving specifi c instructions from the judge to ignore any PTP would decrease its 
impact on mock jurors’ judgments. In addition, the timing of those instructions was 
varied, so that they came either before and after the trial or only at the trial’s conclu-
sion. Based on previous research conducted on criminal cases, it was predicted that ju-
dicial instructions at the end of trial would have little or no effect at eliminating the ef-
fect of PTP (Kramer et al., 1990), but that instructions given to jurors both before and 
after the trial would mitigate the effect of PTP (Kaplan & Wrightsman, 1979). 
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and two undergraduate students participated in exchange for extra 
credit. The sample was 87% female, and the age range was 18–53 (Mdn = 20). 
Design 
A 2 × 3 between-subjects design was used. Participants were assigned to one of 
two PTP conditions in which they read either a control or a PTP article. Because the 
effect of PTP that was prejudiced against the defendant was stronger in Experiment 1 
than the effect of PTP prejudiced against the plaintiff, the PTP in the present experi-
ment concerned the defendant. Participants were further assigned to one of the three 
judicial instruction conditions: no additional judicial instructions (Control), additional 
instructions relevant to the PTP after reading the trial summary (After), and additional 
instructions both before and after reading the trial summary (Before/After). 
Materials 
The case materials, PTP articles (from the control and defendant-PTP conditions), 
and general instructions were identical to those used in Experiment 1, except that the 
instructions were presented orally rather than in written format. Participants in the Af-
ter and Before/After instruction conditions received the following additional judicial 
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instructions specifi cally directing them to disregard any pretrial publicity to which 
they may have been exposed concerning the trial: 
You are to determine the facts solely from the evidence presented in the case. 
Do not use information in pretrial publicity or your reaction to it as a basis for 
judgment in the case. Pretrial publicity is information you received before the 
actual evidence was presented and would include things like any newspaper ar-
ticles you read or TV news you saw that dealt with this case. 
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except for the additional instruc-
tions that were read aloud to participants in the After and Before/After instruction 
conditions. 
Results
The dichotomous liability ratings were scored as 0 (not liable) or 1 (liable), and 
separate two-way ANOVAs were conducted for the remaining dependent measures. 
Liability Judgments
The percentage of liable verdicts in each condition is shown in Table 3. There was 
a signifi cant main effect of PTP condition, F(1, 196) = 16.94, such that participants 
in the defendant-PTP condition were more likely to fi nd the defendant liable (79.0%) 
than participants in the control condition (52.6%). The effect of instructions fell just 
short of conventional levels of statistical signifi cance, F(2, 196) = 2.94, p = .055. Par-
ticipants in the Before/After condition were somewhat less likely to fi nd the defendant 
liable (55.4%) than participants in the After (69.0%) or Control (74.2%) condition. 
The interaction between PTP and instructions was not signifi cant, F(2, 196) = 1.46. 
The results for causality judgments were very similar to those for verdicts (see Ta-
ble 4). Participants exposed to PTP judged the defendant as signifi cantly more likely to 
have caused the plaintiff’s injury (M = 63.90, SD = 21.94) than participants in the con-
trol condition (M = 46.58, SD = 24.70), F(1, 194) = 27.66. There was also a signifi cant 
effect of instructions, F(2, 194) = 3.03, with participants in the Before/After condition 
giving lower causality estimates (M = 49.47, SD = 25.49) than participants in the After 
and Control conditions (Ms = 58.19 and 58.77, SDs = 22.78 and 25.48, respectively). 
The interaction between PTP and instructions was not signifi cant, F(2, 194) < 1. 
Compensation
One hundred thirty-four participants found the defendant liable (11–30 per condi-
tion) and therefore awarded compensation. Unlike in Experiment 1, PTP had a signif-
icant effect on participants’ log compensation awards, F(1, 127) = 6.86, with partici-
pants exposed to PTP about the defendant awarding more money (M = $591,768, SD = 
$812,727, Mdn = $500,000) than participants in the control condition (M = $381,373, 
SD = $299,408, Mdn = $350,000).There was no effect of instructions, F(2, 127) < 1, 
nor was the interaction signifi cant, F(2, 127) = 1.23. 
Perceptions
As in Experiment 1, PTP that contained negative information about the defendant 
produced a more negative overall impression of the defendant (M = 2.39, SD = 1.35) 
than did the control article (M = 3.09, SD = 1.39), F(1, 194) = 13.54. It also produced 
a more positive impression of the plaintiff than did the control article (Ms = 6.00 vs. 
5.70), F(1, 192) = 3.32. There was no effect of instructions, nor a signifi cant interac-
tion, on perceptions of either the plaintiff or the defendant, Fs < 1. 
Discussion
The results support previous research indicating that judicial admonitions do not 
reduce the biasing effect of PTP (Kramer et al., 1990; Sue et al., 1974); that is, the 
main effect of PTP was not qualifi ed by an interaction with judicial instructions. These 
results do not bode well for the American justice system, which bears the constitution-
al responsibility for a fair and impartial trial (Carroll et al., 1986),as they suggest that 
judicial admonitions do not have their intended effect. 
Although judicial instructions to disregard PTP did not interact with the presence 
or absence of PTP, they did have an overall effect on juror verdicts. This fi nding is 
consistent with research by Kaplan and Wrightsman (1979), who found that the tim-
ing of judicial instructions can have a signifi cant impact on juror verdicts in a crimi-
nal case. In their study, participants were given judicial instructions about presump-
tion of innocence, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt before the trial evidence, 
after the trial evidence, or not at all. Kaplan and Wrightsman found that mock jurors 
who were given judicial instructions before the trial evidence were less likely to fi nd 
the defendant guilty than mock jurors who were instructed after receiving the trial 
evidence or not at all. Furthermore, participants who were given instructions before 
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the trial evidence gave lower probability estimates that the defendant had committed 
the crime than participants in the other two conditions. Although probability of com-
mission estimates were affected, standard of proof estimates were unaffected by the 
instruction manipulation. 
According to Kaplan and Wrightsman (1979), a primacy effect occurred, whereby 
judicial instructions before trial had their intended effect of emphasizing the presump-
tion of innocence and the burden of proof and, thus, of affecting mock jurors’ per-
ceived likelihood that the defendant had committed the crime. The present experiment 
revealed a similar trend. Participants who were given the judicial admonition to focus 
on the evidence presented at trial and not to use the PTP gave lower likelihood of cau-
sation estimates (which are analogous to the probability of commission estimates in 
a criminal case) than participants in the other two conditions. In other words, partici-
pants given the instructions both before and after the trial evidence viewed the defen-
dant as less culpable than participants given the instructions after the trial or not at all, 
and these lowered perceptions of culpability resulted directly in fewer verdicts of lia-
bility.2 The consistency between the fi ndings of the present experiment and those of 
Kaplan and Wrightsman suggests that differential perceptions of culpability underlie 
the effect of the timing of the judicial instructions. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The two experiments taken as a whole present a picture consistent with previous 
research examining the prejudicial effects of PTP in criminal cases (Fain et al., 1997; 
Linz & Penrod, 1992; Moran & Cutler, 1991; Mullin et al., 1996; Otto et al., 1994; Ste-
blay et al., 1999; Studebaker & Penrod, 1997). In particular, we observed two notable 
extensions to the PTP effect. First, the PTP effect was found to generalize to a civil tri-
al. Thus, the concern espoused by the legal community over the potentially biasing ef-
fects of PTP (e.g., Bailis & MacCoun, 1996; Carroll et al., 1986) was further strength-
ened by demonstrating that civil trials are just as susceptible as criminal trials. Second, 
the negative impact of PTP was found to exert its impact on civil plaintiffs as well as 
civil defendants. Presumably, this would hold true for criminal trials as well. Although 
the prosecution in criminal trials is a much more amorphous entity, questions of pros-
ecutorial misconduct (e.g., questions over the methods used to obtain evidence, plant-
ing of evidence, etc.) may be broadcast as PTP. Further research is necessary to deter-
mine if this suspicion holds true. 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that judicial admonitions to disregard PTP did not 
have their intended effect of reducing the PTP’s bias. This fi nding is in line with re-
search that has indicated that judicial admonitions do little to remedy the effects of in-
admissable evidence (e.g., Greene & Dodge, 1995; Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Thomp-
son et al., 1981). The practical implications of this fi nding for the justice system are 
considerable, as other remedies for PTP have added costs, from violations of the First 
Amendment guarantee of free speech (e.g., gag orders) to the enormous expense and 
impracticality of changing venue (Carroll et al., 1986; Studebaker & Penrod, 1997). 
The potential effi ciency and ease of implementation of judicial instructions as a rem-
edy for PTP therefore requires a more thorough investigation to determine whether 
some other manipulation of judicial instructions would be more effective. Nonethe-
less, the picture drawn by the results of Experiment 2 and previous research is not an 
optimistic one. 
Although Kaplan and Wrightsman (1979) found that judicial instructions inform-
ing jurors of the standard of proof, burden of proof, and presumption of innocence pre-
sented before the presentation of trial evidence had their intended effect, the results 
of Experiment 2 suggest that even more subtle instructions may have the same effect-
that is, of lowering initial perceptions of culpability or liability. The instructions giv-
en in Experiment 2 told participants to use only the evidence presented at trial and spe-
cifi cally not to use any PTP. Although these instructions did not have their intended ef-
fect of reducing or eliminating the effects of PTP, they did have the unexpected effect 
of reducing the overall number of verdicts against the defendant when they were pre-
sented before and after the trial evidence. As the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, 
this unexpected result may be construed as an advantage of preinstruction (ForsterLee 
et al., 1993; Smith, 1991). 
There are a few methodological limitations to the present research. Like many oth-
er studies that have examined the effects of PTP (Steblay et al., 1999), the trial materi-
als used in the present study have relatively low ecological validity. Mock jurors, who 
were college undergraduates, simply read a one-page summary of the facts of the case. 
Although such practical limitations are common in preliminary nature or “Stage One” 
research (Diamond, 1997), an actual trial would present a more diverse sample of ju-
rors with much more extensive proceedings, involving considerably more evidence 
and witness testimony. However, in a review of the literature, Bornstein (1999) found 
few differences between jury simulations using simple stimuli such as transcripts and 
those using more realistic stimuli such as live trial presentations. Specifi cally regard-
ing the effects of PTP, Kramer and Kerr (1989) found that longer, more complex trials 
did not mitigate PTP’s effects. With regard to the identity of the mock jurors, jury sim-
ulations as a whole have uncovered few differences between student and community 
mock jurors (Bornstein, 1999), and Steblay et al. (1999) found that PTP effects were 
actually greater with community-drawn adult samples than with student mock jurors. 
Longer, more realistic trials are likely to have greater amounts of both PTP and tri-
al evidence, as well as a longer interval between exposure to the PTP and trial. Steblay 
et al. (1999) found that longer intervals between PTP and trial actually produce larg-
er PTP effects than the very short intervals used in the present study. This fi nding sug-
gests that the PTP effects found in the present study may, if anything, underestimate 
what would occur in a real civil trial. 
The fi nal limitation of the current study concerns the lack of a deliberation phase, 
wherein the mock jurors could deliberate about their liability judgments. Although 
Kerr et al. (1990) and Steblay et al. (1999) both found that deliberation did not lessen 
PTP’s effects in a criminal trial simulation, it is possible that deliberation would yield 
2 Unfortunately, liability threshold estimates were not obtained in the present experiment. 
and an alternative explanation—that judicial instructions given before and after trial raised partic-
ipants’ preponderance of the evidence thresholds—cannot be dismissed. However, the relatively 
explicit nature of the preponderance standard in terms of its probability threshold—at least com-
pared to the reasonable doubt standard (Kagehiro, 1990)—makes this possibility unlikely. 
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different effects in a civil case, given the lower standard of proof and the different 
judgments required of jurors (i.e., the awarding of damages in addition to determining 
liability). Despite these limitations, the present research offers a meaningful extension 
of the empirical fi ndings regarding PTP to the civil arena. 
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